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This paper is modeled as a hypothetical first lecture in a graduate Microeconomics 
or Mathematical Economics Course. We start with a detailed scrutiny of the notion 
of a utility function to motivate and describe the common patterns across 
Mathematical concepts and results that are used by economists. In the process we 
arrive at a classification of mathematical terms which is used to state mathematical 
results in economics. The usefulness of the classification scheme is illustrated with 
the help of a discussion of fixed-point theorems and Arrow's impossibility theorem. 
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 1. Where do economic agents operate?
Let us consider a standard question in consumer theory { What will be the optimal
consumption bundle of an agent given her utility function, the amount of money she plans
to spend, and the prices of the goods? Formulating this question is a two step procedure.
In the rst step we translate the intuitive understanding of the consumer's problem into
a mathematical framework. In the second step we implicitly argue that the consumer will
choose that feasible bundle which oers her maximum utility.
One may say that this question is stated as if the playground is given and we want to
predict how the player will play. The crucial thing to note is that mathematics is used,
rst and foremost, to delineate the precise structure of the playground in which we allow
economic agents to operate. Answering how an agent will operate is logically the second
step. Economists would summarize the answer to this second question by saying that the
agent will optimize given the relevant constraints.
We shall be interested in the rst step. One of our main goals will be to highlight the
common procedure that is used to formulate the playgrounds in which we let economic
agents operate. This will allow us to provide a succinct and informative answer to the
rst question: Where do economic agents operate? In order to answer this question we
rst need to understand the meaning of a utility function.
A. Utility representation theorem
Let us look at what it takes to be able to write down a utility function for a decision maker
faced with a nite set of alternatives. We will list each step involved in arriving at the
utility representation theorem for this case, describe the meaning of the step, and raise
questions about the assumptions in each step. The aim will be to show that a detailed
scrutiny of this result (which is one of the rst results encountered by students) can be
used to motivate and explain the intuition behind mathematical concepts and results.
1. The Unstructured Set: X is a non-empty nite set of alternatives faced by an agent.4
Description: We assume the existence of a set X that contains a nite number of alterna-
tives from which the agent will have to make a choice. At this stage, the only thing we
know about the set X is the elements it contains and the rule for membership in this set.
In this case, the rule for membership is that all these elements are being considered by the
agent to come up with a nal choice. It is also important to note that each element in X
is irreducible in the sense that it can not be broken down any further into sub-elements.
We shall refer to a set of irreducible elements as an unstructured set if we know nothing
more than the identity of the elements it contains. Now let us question the obvious and
the not so obvious assumptions we have made in this step.
 What if the set of alternatives is not nite? When do we label a set as a nite set?
Do all non-nite sets contain the same number of elements?
4In this paper we will neither discuss the pre-requisites of logic (sentential logic, followed by quantier
theory) that are necessary to formulate a theory of sets, nor an axiomatization of set theory.
2 What is the nature of the alternatives contained in the set? What if they are con-
sumption streams spread over nite or innite time horizon, lotteries (von-Neumann
and Morgenstern, 1944), or acts whose outcomes depend on the state of world which
is uncertain at the moment of making the decision (Savage, 1954)? Will these dif-
ferent possibilities require completely dierent approaches to come up with a utility
representation theorem?
 Does every collection of objects qualify as a set?5
2. The Tool: R is a binary relator (or, a binary relation) dened over the elements of X
where xRy means the agent believes `x is at least as good as y.'
Description: We assume that the agent possesses a tool - a binary relator - that will
(potentially) allow her to establish a relationship between any pair of elements in the set
X (and thereby provide some structure to the elements of X). Given the nature of the
issue under consideration, we endow the tool with a specic meaning to make precise the
nature of the relationship the agent is assumed to establish between any pair of elements
from the set X. In this context, we assume the tool stands for `is at least as good as.' The
following questions immediately come to mind.
 Why should we assume that the agent uses one, and only one, binary relator to struc-
ture the unstructured set of alternatives. For instance, it seems no less reasonable
to assume that one might use two binary relators in a sequential manner (Manzini
and Marriotti, 2007; Rubinstein and Salant, 2008). The rst binary relator could
help her partition the set of alternatives into two disjoint subsets: the rst subset
containing all those elements the agent thinks she may ultimately choose, and the
second containing those elements the agent is sure she will denitely not choose.
The second binary relator may then be used to rank only the elements of the rst
subset.
 Is the binary relator a `new' entity or is it derived from the unstructured set of
alternatives we started with?
3.1 Properties of the Tool: R is a weak-order over X. In other words, the binary relator
satises the properties of transitivity and completeness.
Description: We assume this tool satises two properties that we consider to be reasonable
in this context. Transitivity requires that if the agent believes x is at least as good as y
and y is at least as good as z, then she must also believe that x is at least as good as z.
Completeness imposes the restriction that the agent must be able to compare every pair
of alternatives in the unstructured set X.
 There is nothing that forces the decision maker to have a transitive and complete
binary relator. These are assumptions we have made. Hence, we can question these
properties and replace them with other properties if intuition and/or empirical evi-
dence suggests so (Gilboa, 2009). What could be those other properties?
5We can do no better than point the reader to Nagel and Newman (2008) for a discussion of the
importance of this question in modern mathematics.
33.2 The Structured Set: (X;R) is a weakly-ordered set.
Description: Transitivity and completeness of the binary relator ensure that the agent can
rank all the alternatives from the most preferred to the least preferred (she may give the
same rank to two distinct alternatives). We are referring to the set of alternatives now
as a structured set because this is precisely what the tool allows the agent to do: provide
some structure to the initially unstructured set of alternatives. Given the nature of the
tool and its properties, in addition to knowing what are the irreducible elements of X, we
also have the information that the agent will have a ranking over the elements of the set.
Given an unstructured set, if we use a binary relator as the tool and endow it with the
properties of transitivity and completeness, then the structured set we obtain is referred
to as a weakly-ordered set.
 Will we get a dierent structured set if we replace transitivity or/and completeness
with some other properties?
 We started with the unstructured set of alternatives and assumed the decision maker
uses a binary relator satisfying two properties to convert the unstructured set of
alternatives into a structured set. Do we obtain all structured sets via the same
procedure?
 Are binary relators the only tools that can be used to structure unstructured sets?
If there are other tools, are they fundamentally dierent from binary relators? Or,
are all tools expressions of a single underlying concept?
4. Utility Representation Theorem: It may be stated as follows.
If
 X is a nite unstructured set of alternatives; and,
 the binary relator R dened over X is transitive and complete,
then
 there exists a real-valued function u : X ! R such that xRy if and only if u(x)  u(y).
Description: If the binary relator satises properties that help structure the unstructured
set of alternatives into a weakly ordered set, then we can write down a utility function for
the agent. In other words, we can map each alternative in the set of alternatives to an
element in the set of real number such that if the agent thinks alternative x is at least as
good as alternative y, then the real number associated with x will be at least as large as
the real number associated with y. The list of questions one could ask at this step is quite
long. In this paper, we wish to raise only one.
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Figure 1: The Common Procedure
2. Converting an unstructured set into a structured set
The set of real numbers is a structured set. So is a pre-ordered set, a partially ordered set,
a weakly ordered set, a linearly ordered set, a lattice, a group, an ordered eld, a metric
space, a vector space, a normed vector space, an inner product space, a Banach space,
a Polish space, a Hilbert space, a topological space, a probability space, and ::: They
are often used in economic modeling and most of them appear in the rst year graduate
textbooks by Mas-Colell et al. (1995), Myerson (1997), and Stokey and Lucas (1989).
Structured sets are usually the playgrounds where economic agents operate in mathe-
matical models. Instead of highlighting the dierences between these structured sets, we
want to focus on the one feature they all have in common. They are all formulated by
using, essentially, a common procedure: we start with an unstructured set, choose some
tools, and endow these tools with certain properties to add some structure to the elements
of the unstructured set (Figure 1).
Starting with the same unstructured set we end up with dierent structured sets if
the tools and/or their properties dier. We next provide a brief outline of this common
procedure. Even the readers familiar with Axiomatic Set Theory (Bourbaki, 1950; Debreu,
1959; Halmos, 1974; Weintraub, 2002) may nd the exposition interesting.
The notion of an unstructured set is the starting point of our discussion (please refer
to Table 1 for the technical notation used throughout the paper). We can talk about
some notions related to sets in a meaningful way even if we know nothing more than the
irreducible elements of the set(s) we are considering. Subset of a set, cardinality of a set,
power set of a set, union and intersection of two sets, dierence of two sets, disjoint subsets
of a set, partition of a set, cartesian product of two sets, and n-fold cartesian product of
a set are examples of such notions.6
Before proceeding we would like to elaborate on the notions of `power set' of a set and
the `cartesian product set' of (two or more) sets as they will be appear quite often in the
following discussion. Consider set X = fx1;x2g and set Y = fy1;y2;y3g. The power set of
6It is crucial to note that it takes certain axioms of set theory to assert the existence of, say, a power
set of any given set or the union of two sets. Moreover, one may use dierent combinations of axioms to
formulate a theory of sets. Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice (ZFC) is the dominant
framework used by economists. Several researchers have questioned the reliance on ZFC to mathematically
represent economic notions because of its non-constructivist features: the existence of some mathematical
objects is assumed in ZFC even if one can not provide an algorithm to show how those objects may be
constructed. A detailed discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of the present paper. The interested
reader may refer to Vellupillai (2010) for a critical discussion of the drawbacks of ZFC and suggestions for
a constructive framework for economic modeling.
5Table 1: Useful Notationy
Symbol Meaning
X = fx1;x2g an unstructured set whose irreducible elements are x1 and x2
; the empty set, or null set (a set that contains no elements)
jXj Cardinality of a set (number of elements in the set)
(X;T) Structured set (where T is the tool used to add structure to X)
2 belongs to (for example, x1 2 X = fx1;x2g)
8 for all (for example, x  3; 8x 2 X = f3;4;5g)
9 there exists (for example, 9 x 2 X = f3;4;5g such that 3 < x < 5)
 is a proper subset of (for example, fx;yg  X = fx;y;zg)
P(X) Power-set of set X (the collection of all possible subsets of X)
X  Y Cartesian product of set X and set Y
Y  X Cartesian product of set Y and set X
X  X 2-fold Cartesian product of set X (also denoted as X2)
y See the Appendix for a detailed example.
6a set contains all possible subsets of the given set (including the empty set). Thus,
P(X) = f;;fx1g;fx2g;fx1;x2gg; and
P(Y) = f;;fy1g;fy2g;fy3g;fy1;y2g;fy1;y3g;fy2;y3g;fy1;y2;y3gg:
The cartesian product of set X and set Y is given by
X  Y = f(x1;y1);(x1;y2);(x1;y3);(x2;y1);(x2;y2);(x2;y3)g:
We should think of X  Y as one set. The six elements listed in the set above are the
irreducible elements of `the' set X  Y. Each irreducible element of the set X  Y is an
ordered pair composed of two entities listed in the order in which the sets are multiplied:
the rst is an irreducible element of the set X and the second is an irreducible element of
the set Y. The cartesian product set of n sets will be a collection of ordered n-tuples.
We can similarly formulate the n-fold cartesian product set of a given set. For example,
the 2-fold cartesian product set of set X is given by
X  X = f(x1;x1);(x1;x2);(x2;x1);(x2;x2)g:
The set X  X may also be denoted as X2. The irreducible element (x1;x2) is considered
distinct from the irreducible element (x2;x1). We may imagine that there are two copies
of the set X and we keep track of whether an element came from the rst copy or the
second copy of set X.
Suppose we start with one unstructured set. All the tools that can help us convert this
unstructured set into a structured set are expressions of a single concept (which will be
discussed later). In practice, it is convenient to attach a label to a tool in order to clarify
what the tool allows us to do with/to the elements of the unstructured set.
The two basic tools used to structure unstructured sets are labeled as binary relators
and binary operators. Binary relators help us talk about a certain type of relationship
between two elements of a given set. For example, the binary relator `is at least as good
as' is often used to talk about the preferences of an agent over a set of alternatives. Given
a set a people, `is in love with', `is married to', `is taller than' are some examples of binary
relators that can be used to describe a particular type of relationship between two people
belonging to the set. In contrast, a binary operator uses a pair of elements belonging to
a set as input and produces a third entity belonging to the same set as the output.7
A. Binary relators as structuring tools
Given an unstructured set X, a binary relator R dened over set X is a tool that can be
used to describe the relationship between two irreducible elements of X. If x and y are
irreducible elements of the unstructured set X, then xRy is read as `x is related to y.' It
7At this stage, one may think of addition and multiplication over the set of real numbers as examples
of binary operators.
7is crucial to note that the notion of a binary relator can be invoked only after we have
specied the unstructured set. Let us now look at some properties that binary relators
can be endowed with (see Tables 2 and 3).
Re
exivity: A binary relator R dened over a set X is re
exive if xRx is true for every x
in the set X. We will accept the statement `person x is as tall as person x.' But, will we
accept the statement { x is a son of x { for any human being? These examples highlight
that re
exivity is not a vacuous property (an impression one may get in the context of
individual choice theory where it seems super
uous to say that object x is at least as good
as object x from the perspective of an individual).
Transitivity: A binary relator R dened over a set X is transitive if xRy and yRz imply
that xRz is true. If x is an enemy of y, and y is an enemy of z, then our experience with
realpolitik might suggest that x may not be an enemy of z. Thus, when the unstructured
set is a group of people, the binary relator `is an enemy of' may not be transitive. On the
other hand, the binary relator `is at least as heavy as' will be transitive.
Completeness: A binary relator R dened over a set X is complete if xRy or/and yRx for
any x;y in the set X. It requires that we should be able to relate any pair of elements
from the unstructured set. Once again, consider a decision maker faced with an unstruc-
tured set of alternatives X = fa;b;cg, where the alternatives are three job oers she has.
Assume that she uses the binary relator `at least as good as' to relate the elements of the
unstructured set. Even after days of thinking the decision maker may not be able to con-
clude either bRc or cRb. This does not mean that she is indierent between the two jobs.
It could really mean that she can not compare the two. When we assume completeness,
we rule out such a possibility. If we set y = x, then completeness will tell us that xRx.
Hence, if a binary relator dened over some set is complete, then it will also be re
exive.
Symmetry: A binary relator R dened over a set X is symmetric if xRy implies that yRx
is true. Consider the binary relator R with the meaning `is married to.' For a given set of
people, if we know x is married to y, then our experience with our world suggests that y is
married to x. Thus, `is married to' is a symmetric binary relator over a set of people. Now
consider the binary relator `is in love with' over the same set of people. Clearly, even if it
is true that x is in love with y, it does not necessarily imply that y is in love with x. Hence,
the binary relator `is in love with' may or may not be symmetric over a given set of people.
Asymmetry: A binary relator R dened over a set X is asymmetric if xRy implies that
yRx is false. Consider the binary relator R with the meaning `is a son of.' If we know
that x is a son of y, then we can conclude that y can not be a son of x. Thus, `is a son of'
is an asymmetric binary relator over a set of people.
Antisymmetry: Consider the set of real numbers and assume the binary relator R stands
for `is weakly greater than.' xR3 would mean that the real number x is weakly greater
than 3. 3Rx would mean that 3 is weakly greater than x. Let us now try to nd all
the real numbers x such that both xR3 and 3Rx are true. The only number x that will
allow both these conditions to hold is 3. In other words, antisymmetry requires that if x
is related to y and y is related to x, then x and y must be the same irreducible element
8Table 2: Some Properties of Binary Relators
Property of R Meaning
Re
exivity For every x in set X, xRx is true.
Transitivity For every x;y;z in set X, if xRy and yRz are true, then xRz is true.
Completeness For every x;y in set X, either xRy or yRx (or, both).
Symmetry For every x;y in set X, if xRy is true, then yRx is true.
Asymmetry For every x;y in set X, if xRy is true, then yRx is false.
Antisymmetry For every x;y in set X, if xRy and yRx are true, then x = y.
Table 3: Binary relators defined over a set of people
Property of R Example (Possible) Counterexample
Re
exivity is at least as tall as is the son of
Transitivity is at least as heavy as is an enemy of
Completeness is at least as heavy as is strictly heavier than
Symmetry is married to is in love with
Asymmetry is the mother of is the brother of
Antisymmetry has the ngerprint of is as tall as
9Table 4: Structured sets using one binary relator
Properties of the Binary relator Structured Set
Re
exivity, Transitivity Pre-ordered set
Re
exivity, Transitivity, Antisymmetry Partially-ordered set
Transitivity, Completeness Weakly-ordered set
Transitivity, Completeness, Antisymmetry Linearly-ordered set
in the unstructured set. Now consider a decision maker faced with an unstructured set of
alternatives X = fa;b;cg, where the three elements are an apple, a banana, and a carrot.
Assume that she uses the binary relator `at least as good as' to relate the elements of
the unstructured set. Suppose she feels aRb and bRa. Or, she feels that an apple is at
least as good as a banana, and a banana is at least as good as an apple. This in no way
implies that an apple is the same object as a banana. In short, antisymmetry rules out
indierence between distinct elements of the set.
Table 4 provides a list of some structured sets that can be formulated using one binary
relator as the structuring tool. For instance, if we use a binary relator satisfying re
exivity
and transitivity, then the resulting structured set is labeled a pre-ordered set.
When we are doing pure mathematics we do not need to specify the meaning of the
binary relator. We may simply ask what type of structured set will emerge if we endow
the tool with certain properties. In contrast, when we apply mathematics to any `real
world' issue then we have to specify the meaning of the tools we are using. For instance,
if a sociologist wants to study the father-son relationship over a given set of men, then she
will have to specify the meaning of the binary relator as `is the son of.' Moreover, once
we specify the meaning of the binary relator, we loose the freedom to endow it with any
property we want if we want to make logically valid statements. Given a set of men, we
will accept the statement `person x is as tall as person x.' But, we will not accept the
statement `x is the son of x.' The binary relator `is as tall as' can be endowed with the
property of re
exivity but `is the son of' can not.
We rely on our experiences with our world while making the judgement that `x is a son
of x' is not a valid statement. Thus, pure mathematics allows us to conceive worlds other
than the one we inhabit. One such world which is mathematically feasible but dierent
from ours would be where the statement `x is a son of x' is perhaps true.
10B. Binary operators as structuring tools
Given an unstructured set X, a binary operator dened over set X can be thought of as a
machine that takes any pair of irreducible elements from X as the input and produces an
irreducible element belonging to X as the output. Let x  y denote the output when we
rst feed x and then y into the binary operator denoted by . Once again, the notion of a
binary operator can be introduced only after we have specied the set over which it will
operate. Table 5 summarizes some properties that binary operators can be endowed with.
Closure: If x and y are any two elements from the set X, then x  y must also belong to
set X. In words, closure requires that the output produced by the binary operator must
be an irreducible element of the unstructured set we started with. Consider `adding' two
natural numbers contained in the set of natural numbers. The nal outcome is also a
natural number. But, subtracting two natural numbers may lead to an output that does
not belong to the set of natural numbers. Note that we have included the notion of closure
in the denition of a binary operator.
Associativity: The binary operator, as per our denition, can act on only two elements at
a time. Suppose we have three elements that have to be used to produce a nal output.
We will necessarily have to rst use two out of these three elements to produce an interme-
diate output; and then combine this intermediate output with the remaining element to
obtain the nal output. Suppose we lay down the three elements in the sequence x y z
on a table from left to right. We have to rst pick any two adjacent elements. We have
only two possibilities: x and y, or y and z. Suppose we pick x and y. Associativity then
asks us to feed x and then y into the binary operator and collect the intermediate output
w = xy. Then, we must feed w followed by z, respecting the order in which we had laid
the three elements on the table. If we had instead picked y and z, then we would have
to rst feed y and then z into the binary operator. Let the resulting intermediate output
be v = y  z. In order to get the nal output in this case, we will have to feed rst x
and then v. Associativity requires that the nal output in the two cases must be the same.
Remark 1. The more changes we do to any given production process, the more likely it
will be that the output will vary. Associativity develops a notion of what would be a mi-
nor perturbation of the production process. It requires the same output if the production
process is perturbed in this minor way.
Existence of a unique identity element with respect to the binary operator: It stipulates
the existence of a special element in the unstructured set. It says that there must exist a
special irreducible element in the unstructured set such that whenever we feed this special
element and another element (which may be this special element itself), then we obtain
the other element as the output irrespective of the order in which we feed the two elements
into the binary operator. This should remind us of the role played by zero with respect to
addition, or of the role played by one with respect to multiplication, over the set of real
numbers. This in turn claries why we have denoted the identity element as s and not
simply s. The subscript is used to highlight that there could be several binary operators
that satisfy associativity, and each such operator may induce a dierent identity element.
11Table 5: Some Properties of Binary Operators
Property of  Meaning
Closure x  y 2 X, 8x;y 2 X:
Associativity (x  y)  z = x  (y  z), 8x;y;z 2 X:
Identity 9 s 2 X such that s  x = x  s = x, 8x 2 X:
Inverse If x 2 X, then 9 ~ x 2 X such that x  ~ x = ~ x  x = s:
Commutativity x  y = y  x, 8x;y 2 X:
To repeat, addition and multiplication both satisfy associativity over the set of real num-
bers, but the identity element induced by addition is zero, whereas the identity element
induced by multiplication is one.
Existence of an inverse element for every element in the unstructured set with respect to
the binary operator: Recall our intuitive understanding of addition over the set of real
numbers. For each real number x in the set of real numbers, there exists the real number
 x in the set of real numbers, such that if we add the two together the outcome is zero,
irrespective of the order in which we add the two numbers. Moreover, the output (zero)
is the identity element with respect to addition over the set of real numbers. Similarly,
for each real number x 6= 0 in the set of real numbers, there exists the real number x 1
in the set of real numbers, such that if we multiply the two together the outcome is one,
irrespective of the order in which we multiply the two numbers. Moreover, one is the
identity element with respect to multiplication over the set of real numbers. The inverse
property captures these intuitive notions.
Commutativity: If x and y are any two elements from the set X, then x  y must be the
same as y x. Or, it requires that the output produced by the binary operator should not
depend on the order in which the two inputs are fed into the operator. Addition over the
set of real numbers is commutative but subtraction is not.
Remark 2. Mathematics is often regarded as a language that helps us structure our dis-
course about real world phenomena. We use the word `add' in conversations in our daily
lives in numerous contexts. In many of these contexts the order in which two things are
`added' to produce a third thing does matter. For instance, a common way to cook pasta
is to rst add water in a pan and heat it for, say, fteen minutes, and then add raw pasta
into the hot water. The output is likely to be dierent if we reverse the order by rst
adding raw pasta to the pan, heating it for fteen minutes, and then adding water.
12Table 6: Structured sets using one binary operator
Properties of the Binary Operator Structured Set
Closure Magma
Closure, Associativity Semi-group
Closure, Associativity, Identity Monoid
Closure, Associativity, Identity, Inverse Group
Closure, Associativity, Identity, Inverse, Commutativity Abelian Group
As with binary relators, when we are doing pure mathematics we can reasonably ask
what type of structured set will emerge if we endow a binary operator with certain proper-
ties. For instance, a Group is a structured set obtained by endowing a binary relator with
all the properties listed above except commutativity (see table 6). Some of the structured
sets listed in Table 6 are rarely explicitly encountered in economic modeling. We have
listed them solely to highlight that the same procedure is used to generate all of them.
We may also use two or more tools to provide some structure to the elements of an
unstructured set. For instance, we need to use three tools (the binary relator `is weakly
greater than' and the binary operators of addition and multiplication) to arrive at the
structured set referred to as the set of rational numbers. The set of real numbers is ob-
tained by imposing an additional property.8
C. Tools identify subsets
We have looked at two tools that can be used to add structure to an unstructured set.
A natural question to ask would be: Can these seemingly distinct tools be understood as
expressions of a single concept? These tools identify a subset of a suitably dened set
derived from the unstructured set we start with. In fact, one may say that tools are subsets.
C.1. Binary relator dened over X identies a subset of X2
Consider the set X = fa;b;cg, where the three elements refer to an apple, a banana, and
a carrot. The 2-fold cartesian product of X with itself will be
X2 = f(a;a);(a;b);(a;c);(b;a);(b;b);(b;c);(c;a);(c;b);(c;c)g:
Suppose a decision maker has a binary relator R dened over the set X.
8See the Appendix for details.
13Case 1. Let R stand for `is at least as good as.' Suppose we know that R is re
exive. This
would mean that aRa, bRb, and cRc are true. The one and only subset of X2 identied
by this R is
A1 = f(a;a);(b;b);(c;c)g:
Case 2. Let R stand for `is strictly better than.' Now suppose we know that R is transitive
and complete and aRb, bRc, and aRc are true. We may say that this R identies the set
A2 = f(a;b);(b;c);(a;c)g:
Remark 3. Case 2 highlights the importance of treating the irreducible elements of X2 as
ordered pairs. Specically, the R in Case 2 identies one and only one subset of X2 (i.e.,
A2). It does not identify, for instance,
A3 = f(b;a);(b;c);(a;c)g or A4 = f(b;a);(c;b);(c;a)g:
C.1. Binary operator dened over X identies a subset of X3
Consider an unstructured set X containing countable elements f:::;;;
;:::g. First note
that the irreducible elements of the 3-fold cartesian product of X with itself { X3 { will
be ordered triples of the form (;
;), (;
;), etc. We can interpret the ordered triple
(;;
) as saying: when we rst feed  and then  into the binary operator, it produces

 as the output.
Now consider the process of using a binary operator (denoted by the symbol ) to
provide some structure to X. We have assumed that binary operators satisfy the closure
property, by denition. Consequently, if we feed any two irreducible elements of X into the
binary operator , then the output will also be an irreducible element of X. The binary
operator  identies a subset S of X3.
To understand this intuitively, let us look at the set of all integers Z and treat the
binary operator  as the standard operator for addition. We know that ( 3) + 5 = 2.
This fact can be represented as the ordered triple ( 3;5;2) if we agree that the rule we
will use to interpret this triple will be as follows: ( 3;5;2) means that when we rst feed
-3 and then 5 into the binary operator +, then it produces 2 as the output.
Given this rule of interpretation, the ordered triples (2;9; 3) and (100;0;0) do not
make sense. But, ordered triples like (100;0;100) and (0;0;0) do make sense. Clearly,
some irreducible elements of Z3 are consistent with the binary operation of addition,
while others are not. This claries why we say that a binary operator dened over a set
identies `a subset of the 3-fold cartesian product of the set with itself.'
This discussion leads us to take note of an important point. The starting point of our
discussion is the notion of an unstructured set, say X. We talked about tools that can be
used to add structure to X. We may attach a label to the tools { binary relators, binary
operators, etc. { but the tools will turn out to be subsets of suitably dened sets derived
from X.
Remark 3. Any mathematical notion that we could potentially discuss after specifying the
unstructured sets we start with will necessarily be a subset of some cartesian product set
14that can be formulated using the sets we start with. This should not be surprising since
the universe of our discourse is limited by the unstructured sets we start with.
3. Dealing with two sets: Mappings
Till now we have been concerned with just one set and the discussion has focused on
describing the common procedure that is used to convert an unstructured set into a struc-
tured set. The concept of a mapping (a function or a correspondence) comes into the
picture when we want to mathematically express a piece of information that involves ref-
erence to two sets (where each of them may be unstructured or structured and the two
sets may or may not be identical to each other).
Consider two unstructured sets X and Y containing the names of all married men and
women in a society, respectively. Suppose the society is monogamous and only allows
heterosexual marriages. Then we can dene a function { f : X ! Y { which takes the
name of a man as the input and produces the name of his wife as the output. Let f(x)
denote the element of set Y that is produced as the output when the element x belonging
to set X is used as the input. We can describe the relationship between the elements of
these two sets with the help of a binary relator R with the meaning `is the husband of.'
Clearly, xRf(x) can be read as `man x is the husband of woman f(x).'
For a polygynous society we can dene a correspondence { fc : X ! P(Y) { which takes
the name of a man as the input and produces the names of all his wives as the output.
The set P(Y) contains all the non-empty subsets of the set Y. Thus, a correspondence is a
mapping that describes the relationship between an element of one set and at least one ele-
ment of another set. We may now read xRfc(x) as `man x is the husband of women fc(x).'
A. Mappings as structuring tools
Suppose X = fc1;c2;c3g is the set containing the names of the three most populated cities
in the world at a given time. We are interested in dening a function that takes any city
from the set X as the input and produces a real number denoting the population of the
city as the output. Formally, this function may be denoted as f : X ! R.
Now suppose we are interested in dening a function that takes any pair of cities from
the set X as the input and produces a real number denoting the distance between the
two cities as the output. Formally, this distance function may be denoted as d : X2 ! R.
The notation used for the input set { X2 { claries that the distance function takes one
irreducible element from the 2-fold cartesian product of set X as the input. Note that the
set X2 is a collection of nine irreducible elements. Or,
X2 = f(c1;c1);(c1;c2);(c1;c3);(c2;c1);(c2;c2);(c2;c3);(c3;c1);(c3;c2);(c3;c3)g:
If we use any of the nine irreducible elements of X2 as the input, the function f produces
a real number as the output. The world around us does not come equipped with a notion
of distance between two points. We choose to dene the distance between two points and
thus we may do so in many ways. But, we should rst ask: What should be the essential
15properties of a function d : X2 ! R that calculates the distance between two points? We
may use the following three properties.
 Non-negativity: d(x;y)  0, for all x;y in X, and f(x;y) = 0 i x = y.
 Symmetry: d(x;y) = d(y;x), for all x;y in X.
 Triangular inequality: d(x;y)  d(x;z) + d(z;y), for all x;y;z in X.
Once we endow d with these three properties, we obtain one of the most widely used
structured sets in economics. The function d is termed a metric and the structured set
(X;d) is called a Metric Space. There can be many functions that satisfy the three prop-
erties mentioned above. For instance, suppose X is R2, i.e., the 2-fold cartesian product
of the set of real numbers. Thus, any irreducible element of X will be a pair of two real
numbers. We could calculate the distance between x;y 2 R2 by using
de(x;y) =
p
(x1   y1)2 + (x2   y2)2;
or some other function that satises the three properties. Given any metric space, once
we specify a particular way of calculating the distance, we add more structure to it. When
we use the metric de over R2, we get the 2-dimensional Euclidean Space. This discussion
highlights that a function may also be used as a tool to add more structure to a set. As
mentioned above (Remark 3), like binary relators and binary operators, functions also
identify subsets of suitably dened sets formulated from the sets we start with.
B. Mappings identify subsets
Any function f : X ! Y identies a subset of the set Y  X. Consider the exercise of
drawing the function f(x) = x2 (where f takes a real number as the input and produces
a real number as output) on a two dimensional graph with values of x on the horizontal
axis and the values of f(x) on the vertical axis. In the rst step we draw the horizontal
and the vertical axes. It is crucial to recall that this simple act of drawing the two axes
amounts to laying out all the elements of the set RR, where R is the set of real numbers.
Every point on this two-dimensional plane is an ordered pair labeled as (y;x), and thus
an irreducible element of the set R  R. In the next step, we draw the actual function
f(x) = x2. The act of drawing the function is nothing more than pointing out the subset
of the set R  R that this function identies.
4. A possible classication of mathematical terms
Sets, binary relators, binary operators, and functions are often regarded as the four basic
concepts of mathematics (Gowers, 2008). The discussion of the utility representation
theorem presented earlier not only involves a reference to all these concepts but it also
suggests a way to classify mathematical terms. This exercise may be a useful way to
highlight the intuitive connections between seemingly distinct mathematical concepts.
As mentioned earlier, if Axiomatic Set Theory is used as the framework to formalize
economic notions then the starting point of the discourse will necessarily be one or more
unstructured sets. All subsequent mathematical terms can then be expressed as subsets
16of appropriately dened sets derived from the unstructured sets we start with. This is an
important observation but may not be of much practical help for an economist. We use the
utility representation theorem as a guide to classify mathematical terms into four classes




 mappings between two sets.9
This classication stresses that mathematical modeling in economics often involves us-
ing one or more unstructured sets as the building blocks for everything that follows. Figure
2 illustrates this classication scheme. The solid (broken) arrows represent a mapping be-
tween one unstructured set and one structured set (two unstructured or two structured
sets). The direction of the arrows is being used to distinguish the input set and output
set associated with the mapping.
We can talk about the notion of a subset of a set whether it is unstructured or struc-
tured. But, we can not talk about the convexity of an unstructured set. An unstructured
set, as the name suggests, does not have the structure that will allow us to dene the
notion of a `line segment' which is required to talk about the convexity of a set.
On the other hand, a vector space is one of many examples of structured sets that have
enough structure to allow for a meaningful denition of a line segment and thus we can
talk about the notion of a convex subset of a vector space (see the appendix). In general,
any concept that can be meaningfully discussed in the context of a given set when is has
relatively less structure can also be discussed when it has relatively more structure.
We have already discussed some important properties of the two important tools (binary
relators and operators). Functions of various types play an important role in economic
analysis. Once again, there needs to be a certain minimal amount of structure in the
input and output sets associated with the function so that we may talk about the certain
properties such as continuity, convexity, and quasi-concavity.
It is also important to take note of the basic object whose property is being discussed
in any mathematical statement. For instance, the conceptual content of `completeness of
a binary relator' diers from that of `completeness of a metric space.' Table 7 provides a
brief summary of this discussion.
5. Why this classication?
Multiple classication schemes can be used to organize mathematical terms. We have
tried to strike a balance so that the scheme is neither too abstract to be of little practical
use for a student of economics, nor too detailed to distract from the intuitive connections
9Although mappings can be expressed as binary relators, we follow the standard convention and treat
them as distinct objects.
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Figure 2: A classification of mathematical terms.
Table 7: A classification of mathematical terms
Basic Object Example Some related concepts/properties
[1] Unstructured Sets   Cardinality, Subset, Power set
[2] Structuring Tools Binary relator Transitivity, Symmetry, Completeness
[3] Structured Sets Metric space Compactness, Connectedness
[4] Mappings Correspondence Continuity, Convexity, Convex-valued
18between various mathematical terms. In this section we shall rst illustrate that mathe-
matical results are usually stated using the classication scheme presented above. Thus,
familiarity with this classication scheme may be of immense help for students in under-
standing mathematical results. Moreover, keeping track of the four basic mathematical
objects (and their properties) provides a useful framework to organize the theoretical lit-
erature on economic issues. This will be illustrated with the help of a detailed discussion
of Arrow's impossibility theorem.
A. Patterns in mathematical results
The utility representation theorem we have discussed is silent about the nature of alter-
natives faced by the decision maker. They could be perishable objects for immediate
consumption, consumption streams spread over nite or innite time horizon, lotteries, or
acts whose outcomes depend on the eventual state of world which is uncertain at the time
of making the decision. There are utility representation theorems for all these, and several
other, types of alternatives. If all these theorems are referred to as utility representation
theorems, then one would expect some common pattern across them. Similarly, we would
expect some common pattern across all mathematical results referred to as xed point
theorems, all results referred to as separating hyperplane theorems, or any other class of
results. If we take this chain of thought to its extreme, then we are led to ask whether
there is a common pattern across mathematical results, in general.
Mathematical results are usually expressed in the form `if A, then B.' This statement
is too abstract to help us in any signicant way. It is almost tautological to say that if
there is a pattern across mathematical results, then it must be in the contents of A and
B. Having a classication of mathematical terms in mind is useful because it determines
the language we use to express the possible forms that the contents of A and B can take
in any result. We next use xed point theorems (which have been used to prove some
of the most fundamental results in economic theory) to illustrate that the language of
mathematical results employs the above mentioned classication scheme.
Consider the function f(x) = (x   1
2)2, where x 2 [0;1]. It may be easily veried that
the values of f(x) will also lie in the set [0;1]. Thus, we may denote the function as
f : S ! S, where S = [0;1]. It is simply a formal way to say that for each input from the
set S, the function produces a `single' output which belongs to the same set S.
There exists a special element x in S such that when we feed this x as the input into
the function, the output produced is also x (Figure 3). An element x in the set S is a
xed point of the function f (correspondence fc) if x = f(x) (x 2 fc(x)). Let us now
think about the `logical order' of the steps that we must use to talk about xed point(s)
of the above mentioned function.
[Step 1] We have to start with an underlying structured set { the one-dimensional Eu-
clidean space (R;de), where R is the set of real numbers and de denotes the Euclidean
metric on R. It is only then that we can consider a subset of this structured set. It is
important to note that although we did not mention it explicitly, the set S = [0;1] satises
certain properties. It is non-empty, compact, and convex.
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Figure 3: Fixed point of a function
Once again, although we did not mention it explicitly, this function satises certain prop-
erties. It is a continuous function. Let us now look at the general statement of Brouwer's
xed point theorem.
If
 S is a non-empty, compact, and convex subset of a nite dimensional Euclidean
space; and,
 the mapping f : S ! S is continuous,
then
 the mapping f will have at least one xed point.
`A' describes the type and properties of the structured set and the type and properties
of the mapping in Brouwer's xed point theorem. The common pattern across xed point
theorems can be claried by expressing the general form of almost all xed point theorems.
If
 S is a subset of some structured set and satises certain properties; and,
 f is a certain type of mapping from S to S and satises certain properties,
then
 the mapping f will have at least one xed point.
20Table 8: Fixed Point Theorems
Banach Kakutani Glicksberg
Structured Set Metric Space Euclidean Space Normed Vector Space
Properties Complete Non-empty Non-empty
Compact Compact
Convex Convex
Mapping Function Correspondence Correspondence
Properties Contractive Convex valued Convex valued
Closed graphed Closed graphed
This general form highlights the usefulness of the classication of mathematical terms
provided earlier. Table 8 lists the contents of `A' in three other xed point theorems.
In general, we will nd that `A' refers to one or more of the four basic objects and their
properties and `B' species some additional properties of one or more of these basic objects
in any result.
Understanding any result would require us to rst understand the denitions of the
properties associated with the basic objects. Although we do not go into a detailed de-
scription of these properties it should be clear that the denitions of these properties are
also stated using the classication scheme we have described.
B. Arrow's impossibility theorem and related literature
We shall present the set up of the theorem in a stepwise manner and re-examine each step
in the set up (see Appendix III for the formal set up). By its very nature, this process leads
to a selective synthesis of the questions whose origins can be traced to Arrow's theorem .
[Step 1] V is a nite unstructured set containing N  2 voters and A is a nite unstruc-
tured set containing M  3 candidates.
Description: We assume the existence of an unstructured set V that contains a nite
number of voters whose opinions will be used to determine the outcome of the election.
V is indeed an unstructured set since the only thing we know is who are the irreducible
elements of this set. Similarly, we assume the existence of an unstructured set A that
contains a nite number of candidates who are standing in the election.
Questions: We could ask what if the set of voters is (un)countably innite. However, it
21is hard to nd interesting cases that should be modeled in this way. The case where the
set of candidates is not nite captures features of several real world issues (Gaertner, 2006).
[Step 2] L is the nite structured set containing all linear orders (strict rankings) on A.
LN is the N-fold cartesian product of the structured set L.
Description: In this step we assume that each voter possesses a binary relation (the tool)
that satises transitivity, completeness, and antisymmetry. This allows each voter to come
up with a strict ranking over the set of candidates. The set L contains all the possible
ways in which the candidates can be strictly ranked. If there are M candidates, then there
would be (M!) number of ways in which they could be strictly ranked.10 If there are N
voters, then we will receive N strict rankings as the input during the election. Since each
voter may provide any of the strict rankings in the set L as her individual ranking, the
set of possible inputs will be the N-fold cartesian product of set L. Thus, the number of
possible inputs will be (M!)N.
Questions: Re
ections on this step have led to a vast amount of research. We list some of
the main questions that have motivated this research.
 Why should the voters be asked to send a complete (weak or strict) ranking of the
candidates? What if they are asked to report only their most preferred candidate,
or the subset of candidates they approve of? In general, these questions ask: What
is the structure of the input provided by each voter in the social choice process?
 We implicitly assume intra-voter preferences to be ordinal and inter-voter prefer-
ences to be non-comparable when we ask voters to provide a ranking over the can-
didates. How can (and, what if) we allow for intra-voter preferences to be cardinal
and inter-voter preferences to be comparable? If so, what should be the extent of
comparability? Answers to these questions oer one way to understand what does
it take to overcome the impossibility result (Sen, 1977).
 Will a voter have the incentive to truthfully reveal her ranking over the candidates?
The literature on strategy proof mechanism design and implementation theory es-
sentially springs from this question (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975).
[Step 3] The function f : Ln ! L denotes a Social Choice Rule.
Description: The function f can be thought of as a machine that uses a collection of N
individual rankings as the input to produce one strict (social) ranking of the candidates
as the output. Since the set L contains all possible ways in which the candidates can be
strictly ranked, the task of f is to provide an output belonging to the set L for each of
the (M!)N inputs belonging to the set LN. This is often referred to as the unrestricted
domain (of voters' preferences) assumption.
10M! = M  (M   1):::  2  1.
22Questions: Is it reasonable to ask the Social Choice Rule to provide an output for every
possible collective input? Are there situations where individual preferences have a certain
structure so that we only need to search for social choice rules that satisfy our chosen
properties on a restricted domain of preferences? The literature on single-peaked prefer-
ences provides an answer to this question. Clearly, as with the input, another question
we could ask is: What happens if we want a weak-order over the set of candidates as the
output? Or, just the winner of the election, a subset of the set of candidates, etc?
[Step 4] The Social Choice Rule (SCR) should satisfy the axioms of Weak Pareto (WP),
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), and No-Dictatorship (ND).
Description: The axioms are used to impose restrictions on the structure of output given
the features of the input. For example, suppose an input is such that all voters agree on
the relative ranking of a certain pair of candidates. Axiom WP requires that the output
corresponding to this input must have this same relative ranking of these two candidates.
IIA asks us to look at two possible inputs. Suppose the relative ranking of a certain pair
of candidates is the same in both these inputs by all the voters. Axiom IIA requires that
the relative ranking of these two candidates in the outputs corresponding to these two
inputs must be the same. Axiom ND essentially forbids the SCR from producing the
social ranking by only using the individual ranking provided by one particular voter.
Questions: The impact of using the axiomatic approach to design social choice rules
goes beyond social choice theory. We can denitely ask what happens if we replace the
particular axioms used by Arrow with a dierent set of axioms. More importantly, it has
led researchers to ask two extremely useful questions.
 Individual rankings (weak/linear orders) provided by several voters need to be ag-
gregated to come up with a social ranking of the candidates in Arrow's framework.
Are there other interesting real world phenomena where inputs from multiple sources
need to be aggregated/ranked but the individual inputs are not rankings? Journals
can be ranked according to their in
uence on scientic activity (Palacios-Huerta and
Volij, 2004), theories can be ranked according to their predictive accuracy (Gilboa
and Schmeidler, 2003), and researchers may be ranked according to their productiv-
ity (Woeginger, 2008). We may even aggregate the judgements of a group of people
over a set of logical propositions (List and Petit, 2001; Dietrich, 2007). The input is
not a ranking in any of these cases.
 Almost every aggregation problem requires us to specify axioms regarding how we
want to convert inputs into outputs. What are the key principles that underlie the
axioms (used by Arrow and in the subsequent literature)? Thomson (2000) provides
an illuminating discussion of this question and identies the few basic principles
that form the conceptual basis behind the enormous variety of axioms that have
been proposed in social choice theory and related elds.









Properties of Tools 
Figure 4: The Common Procedure
 
 
   Mappings 











Figure 5: A classification of mathematical terms.
24Unstructured sets and related concepts
We refer to a set of irreducible elements as an unstructured set if we know nothing more
than the identity of the elements it contains. The notion of an unstructured set is the
starting point of our discussion (please refer to Table 2 for the technical notation). We
can talk about some notions related to sets in a meaningful way even if we know nothing
more than the irreducible elements of the set(s) we are considering. Subset of a set,
cardinality of a set, power set of a set, union and intersection of two sets, dierence of two
sets, disjoint subsets of a set, partition of a set, cartesian product of two sets, and n-fold
cartesian product of a set are examples of such notions.
It is crucial to note that it takes certain axioms of set theory to assert the existence
of, say, a power set of any given set or the union of two sets. Moreover, one may use dif-
ferent combinations of axioms to formulate a theory of sets. Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory
with the axiom of choice (ZFC) is the dominant framework used by economists. Several
researchers have questioned the reliance on ZFC to mathematically represent economic
notions because of its non-constructivist features: the existence of some mathematical
objects is assumed in ZFC even if one can not provide an algorithm to show how those
objects may be constructed. The interested reader may refer to Vellupillai (2010) for a
critical discussion of the drawbacks of ZFC and suggestions for a constructive framework
for economic modeling.
Let X = fx1;x2g and Y = fx1;y1;y2g be two sets.
 x2 2 X and y1 2 Y.
 fx1g  X (i.e., the set fx1g is a proper subset of X).
 fx1;y1g  Y (i.e., the set fx1;y1g is a proper subset of Y).
 The set X is not equal to set Y. In general, two sets are equal if they contain exactly
the same irreducible elements. Note that this is an axiom of ZFC - the axiom of
extensionality.
 jXj = 2 and jYj = 3. The cardinality of a set may be nite, countably innite, or
uncountably innite. A countably innite set contains as many elements as contained
in the set of natural numbers. Often, we use the term countable to refer to sets that
either have nite or countably innite number of elements. An uncountably innite
set is one that is not countable. The axiom of innity is required to ensure that
there exists a set with innite elements.
 Power set of X is denoted by P(X) = f;;fx1g;fx2g;fx1;x2gg. The axiom of power
set is used to assert the existence of the power set of a given set.
 Power set of Y = P(Y) = f;;fx1g;fy1g;fy2g;fx1;y1g;fx1;y2g;fy1;y2g;fx1;y1;y2gg.
 In general, if jXj = N, then jP(X)j = 2N, where N is a natural number.
 Union of X and Y = X [ Y = fx1;x2;y1;y2g.
25 Intersection of X and Y = X \ Y = fx1g.
 Dierence of X and Y = X   Y = fx2g. (Another notation is: XnY.)
 fx1g and fy1g are disjoint subsets of Y but do not constitute a partition of Y.
 fy1g and fx1;y2g are disjoint subsets of Y that constitute a partition of Y.
 Cartesian Product of set X and set Y is denoted as XY. Note that XY is itself
a set. Similarly, the Cartesian Product of set Y and set X is denoted as Y  X.
 X  Y = f(x1;x1);(x1;y1);(x1;y2);(x2;x1);(x2;y1);(x2;y2)g. Each irreducible ele-
ment of the set X  Y is an ordered pair where the rst element in the pair comes
from the set X and the second comes from the set Y.
 Y  X = f(x1;x1);(x1;x2);(y1;x1);(y1;x2);(y2;x1);(y2;x2)g. The irreducible ele-
ments of the sets X  Y and Y  X are dierent.
 The 2-fold cartesian product of set X with itself is denoted as X  X (or, as X2).
 X2 = f(x1;x1);(x1;x2);(x2;x1);(x2;x2)g. Each irreducible element of X2 is, once
again, an ordered pair.11 The term `ordered' is used to stress that the element (x1;x2)
should not be considered the same as the element (x2;x1).
11If we consider the 3-fold Cartesian product of X with itself, then each irreducible element of the
resulting set (X
3) will be an ordered triple.
26Structured sets via multiple tools
Given an unstructured set X, a binary relator R dened over set X is a tool that can be
used to describe the relationship between two irreducible elements of X. If x and y are
irreducible elements of the unstructured set X, then xRy is read as `x is related to y.' It
is crucial to note that the notion of a binary relator can be invoked only after we have
specied the unstructured set.
Given an unstructured set X, a binary operator dened over set X can be thought of as a
machine that takes any pair of irreducible elements from X as the input and produces an
irreducible element belonging to X as the output. Let x  y denote the output when we
rst feed x and then y into the binary operator denoted by . Once again, the notion of a
binary operator can be introduced only after we have specied the set over which it will
operate.
We have already looked at some structured sets that are obtained by using one binary
relator or one binary operator as the structuring tool. Now we look at some structured
sets that are obtained by using multiple tools.
[] The structured set (X;;
) is a Field if
 it is an Abelian Group with respect to the binary operator ;
 it is an almost-Abelian Group12 with respect to the binary operator 
; and
 
 distributes over  (i.e., x 
 (y  z) = (x 
 y)  (x 
 z), for any x;y;z 2 X).
[] The structured set Q  (X;;
;R) is the set of Rational numbers if
 it is a eld with respect to the two binary operators  and 
;
 the binary relator R is a linear order;
 R is compatible with the binary operators such that
{ xRy implies (x  z)R(y  z), for any x;y;z 2 X; and,
{ xRs and yRs imply (x 
 y)Rs, for any x;y 2 X.
[] The structured set R  (X;;
;R) is the set of Real numbers if
 it satises all the properties to be the set of Rational numbers; and,
 every non-empty S  X with an upper bound in X has a supremum `in X.'
12~ x
 does not belong to X if x = e.
27[] Let S be any non-empty subset of R. The set of
 upper bounds of S is U(S) = fu 2 R : u  s 8 s 2 Sg.
 lower bounds of S is L(S) = fl 2 R : l  s 8 s 2 Sg.
[] Let S be any non-empty subset of R. Then
 the supremum of S in R is the unique smallest element in U(S).
 the inmum of S in R is the unique largest element in L(S).
 the supremum and inmum of S always exist.
 the supremum (inmum) is also referred to as the least upper bound (greatest lower
bound).
[] Let S be any non-empty subset of R. Then
 a maximum of S in R is an element s 2 S with s  s 8s 2 S.
 a minimum of S in R is an element s 2 S with s  s 8s 2 S.
 a maximim and/or minimum of S may not exist.
28Metric Space
[] Let X be any unstructured nonempty set.
[] Let d : X  X ! R be a function that assigns a real number to any pair of elements in
the set X. Intuitively, it takes a pair of elements in the set X as the input and provides
the distance between them (some real number) as the output. We could also say that d
takes an element from the set XX as the input and produces a real number as the output.
[] The tuple (X;d) is called a metric space if the following three conditions hold.
 Non-negativity: d(x;y)  0 8x;y 2 X, and d(x;y) = 0 i x = y.
 Symmetry: d(x;y) = d(y;x) 8x;y 2 X.
 Triangular inequality: d(x;y)  d(x;z) + d(z;y) 8x;y;z 2 X.
[] The function d is called a metric on the set X.
[] Unless necessary, we will denote the metric space as X.
[] "-neighborhood of x in X: For any x 2 X and " 2 R++, the "-neighborhood of x in X is
 the set N";X(x) = fy 2 X : d(x;y) < "g.
[] Open subset of X: A subset S of X is said to be open in X if
 for each x 2 S,
 9 " 2 R++ such that,
 N";X (x)  S.
[] Closed subset of X: A subset S of X is said to be closed in X if
 XnS is open in X.
[] S  X may be open, not open, closed, not closed, clopen, or neither open nor closed.
[] Closure of a subset of X: Given any S  X, the closure of S in X is
 the smallest closed set ClX(S) such that
 S  ClX(S).
29[] Interior of a subset of X: Given any S  X, the interior of S in X is
 the largest open set InX(S) such that
 InX(S)  S.
[] Boundary of a subset of X: Given any S  X, the boundary of S in X is
 ClX(S)   InX(S).
[] Convergent sequence in X: A sequence fxmg 2 X1 converges to x 2 X if
 for each  > 0
 9 a real number M() such that
 d(xm;x) < 
 8m  M().
[] Closed subset of X: A subset S is closed in X if, and only if,
 any sequence all of whose terms are in S
 converges to a point in S, if it converges at all.
[] Bounded subset of X: A subset S is bounded in X if
 9  > 0 such that
 S  N;X(x)
 for some x 2 S.
[] Connected subset of X: A subset S is connected in X i
 S can not be written as S  S1 [ S2
 where S1 \ S2 = ;
 and S1;S2 are open in S.
[] Connected Metric Space X: X is connected i the only clopen subsets of X are X and ;.
[] Dense subset of X: A subset Y is said to be dense in X if
 ClX(Y ) = X.
30[] Separable Metric Space X: X is separable if
 9 Y  X such that
 ClX(Y ) = X
 and Y is countable.
[] Cover of S  X: A collection O of subsets of X is a cover of S in X if
 S  [O.
[] Open cover of S  X: A collection O of subsets of X is an open cover of S in X if
 S  [O
 and each member of O
 is open in X.
[] Compact subset of X: A subset S is compact in X if
 every nite and innite open cover of S in X
 has a nite subset
 that also covers S.
[] Totally bounded subset of X: A subset S is totally bounded in X if
 for any  > 0
 9 a nite subset T of S such that
 S  [fN;X(x) : x 2 Tg.
[] Cauchy sequence in X: A sequence fxmg 2 X1 is said to be cauchy if
 for each  > 0
 9 a real number M() such that
 d(xk;xl) < 
 8k;l  M().
[] Complete Metric Space X: A metric space is complete if every cauchy sequence in X
 converges to a point in X.
31[] A function f : X ! Y takes elements from X as the input and provides elements from
Y as the output. It is important to note that
 f produces only one element from Y as the output for any x 2 X.
 It must produce an output for every x 2 X otherwise it does not qualify as a function.
 f(x) 2 Y is called the image of x 2 X.
 x 2 X is called the pre-image of f(x) 2 Y.
 We may thus say that for each x 2 X the function produces a unique image f(x) 2 Y.
[] A self-map f : (X;dX) ! (X;dX) is a contraction if
 9 K 2 (0;1) such that
 d(f(x);f(y))  Kd(x;y)
 8x;y 2 X.
[] Given a non-empty set X, let P(X) denote the collection of all non-empty subsets of X.
[] A correspondence fc : X ! P(Y) takes elements from X as the input and provides
elements from P(Y) as the output. It is important to note that
 fc produces only one element from P(Y) as the output for any x 2 X; but one
element of P(Y) may contain one or more elements of Y.
 It must produce an output for every x 2 X otherwise it does not qualify as a corre-
spondence.
 fc(x) 2 P(Y) is called the image of x 2 X.
 x 2 X is called the pre-image of fc(x) 2 P(Y).
 We will denote fc : X ! P(Y) as fc : X  Y throughout this section.
32Functions over Metric Spaces
[] Given a function f : (X;dX) ! (Y;dY ), let
 OY denote any open set in (Y;dY )
 OY (y) denote any open set in (Y;dY ) that contains y 2 Y.
 f 1(OY ) denote the subset fx 2 X : f(x) 2 OY g (the pre-image of OY ).
 f 1(OY (y)) denote the subset fx 2 X : f(x) 2 OY (y)g (the pre-image of OY (y)).
[] A function f : (X;dX) ! (Y;dY ) is
 discontinuous at x 2 X if f 1(OY (f(x)) is not open for at least one OY (f(x)).
 continuous at x 2 X if f 1(OY (f(x)) is open for every OY (f(x)).
[] A function f : (X;dX) ! (Y;dY ) is
 discontinuous over X if f 1(OY ) is not open for at least one OY .
 continuous over X if f 1(OY ) is open for every OY .
[] Given a function f : (X;dX) ! (R;de)
 the strict lower contour set of  2 R is LX() = fx 2 X : f(x) < g.
 the strict upper contour set of  2 R is UX() = fx 2 X : f(x) > g.
[] A function f : (X;dX) ! (R;de) is
 USC over X if LX() is open for every  2 R.
 LSC over X if UX() is open for every  2 R.
33Correspondences over Metric Spaces
[] Given a correspondence fc : (X;dX)  (Y;dY ), let
 OY denote any open set in (Y;dY )
 OY (S) denote any open set in (Y;dY ) that contains S  Y.
 the upper inverse image of OY be f 1c(OY ) = fx 2 X : fc(x)  OY g.
 the lower inverse image of OY be f 1c(OY ) = fx 2 X : fc(x) \ OY 6= ;g.
[] A correspondence fc : (X;dX)  (Y;dY ) is
 not UHC at x 2 X if f 1c(OY (fc(x)) is not open for at least one OY (fc(x)).
 not LHC at x 2 X if f 1c(OY (fc(x)) is not open for at least one OY (fc(x)).
[] A correspondence fc : (X;dX)  (Y;dY ) is
 UHC at x 2 X if f 1c(OY (fc(x)) is open for every OY (fc(x)).
 LHC at x 2 X if f 1c(OY (fc(x)) is open for every OY (fc(x)).
[] A correspondence fc : (X;dX)  (Y;dY ) is
 UHC i f 1c(OY ) is open for every OY .
 LHC i f 1c(OY ) is open for every OY .
[] A correspondence fc : (X;dX)  (Y;dY ) is compact-valued if
 fc(x) is a compact subset of Y for each x 2 X.
[] A correspondence fc : (X;dX)  (Y;dY ) is closed-valued if
 fc(x) is a closed subset of Y for each x 2 X.
[] A correspondence fc : (X;dX)  (Rn;de) is convex-valued if
 the set fc(x) is convex for each x 2 X.
[] A correspondence fc : (X;dX)  (Y;dY ) is closed at x 2 X if
 for any convergent sequences (xm) 2 X1 and (ym) 2 Y1 with xm ! x and ym ! y
 y 2 fc(x) if ym 2 fc(xm) for each m  1.
[] A correspondence fc : (X;dX)  (Y;dY ) has a closed-graph x 2 X if
 it is closed at every x 2 X.
34Vector Space
[] Vector Space: Consider a set X whose irreducible elements may be denoted as x;y;z.
In order to obtain the structured set called a vector space, we need to use two binary
operators as the tools. Let us denote these tools as  and . It will be helpful to think
of  as a tool that allows us to add any two elements of X and  as a tool that can be
used to multiply a real number with any element of X. The structured set V  (X;;)
is referred to as a `Vector Space using real numbers' and every element of X is referred to
as a `vector' if
 (X;) is an Abelian-group (which implies that V contains a special element s which
plays the same role as 0 in the case of real numbers);
   x 2 X, for any  2 R and any x 2 X; and
 for any x;y 2 X and any ; 2 R,
{   (  x) = (  )  x;
{ 1  x = x;
{ (  )  x =   x    x; and,
{   (x  y) =   x    y.
[] The Vector Space used most often in economics is one where X = Rn.
[] What is Rn?
[] It is crucial to note that
 we don't know the `distance between any pair of elements' in Rn;
 we don't know the `distance from origin' for any element of Rn;
 there is no order structure over the elements of Rn if n > 1;
 there is no notion of a line or line segment in Rn if n > 1.
[] Similarly,
 we don't know the `distance between any pair of elements' in V;
 we don't know the `distance from origin' for any element of V;
 there is no order structure over the elements of V; but,
 there is a well dened notion of a line or line segment in V.
35[] Consider the following regression model.
y = 0  1N + 1  x + 2  z + u;
where y, x, z, and u are N-dimensional column vectors. Irrespective of the economic
meaning of the variables, when we actually run the regression each entry in these column
vectors is a real number. Thus, these vectors are irreducible elements of the set RN. It
should now be clear that when we run this regression, we are dealing with the vector space
(X;;)  (RN;+;);
where the binary operator + is used to add two elements of RN and the binary operator
 is used to multiply a real number with an element of RN.
A Vector space is also referred to as a linear space. The reason being that we can dene
the notion of a line segment in a vector space. Given any x;y 2 X, if the structured set
(X;;) is a vector space, then the line segment joining x and y is the set
Lxy = f 
 x  (1   ) 
 y j  2 [0;1]g:
If we can dene the notion of a line segment in a structured set, then we have the means
to say whether or not a subset of this set is convex. A subset of a structured set is convex if
the line joining any two points in the subset lies in the subset. Several fundamental results
in economic theory rely heavily on the notion of convexity of a set (Ok, 2006, Chapter H).
[] Normed Vector Space: Suppose we have a vector space V. We can use a variety of
tools to provide some additional structure to the elements of V. We just saw that there
is no notion of `distance from origin' for any element of V. The concept of a `norm' is
used to provide some additional structure to V by ensuring that we can meaningfully talk
about the `distance from origin.' The structured set (V;) is a normed vector space if the
function  : V ! R satises the following three conditions for any x;y 2 V.
 Non-negativity: (x)  0, and (x) = 0 i x = 0.
 Homogeneity: (x) = (x), for any  2 R++.
 Triangular inequality: (x + y)  (x) + (y).
[] If  is a norm over V, then dening d(x;y) = (x y) gives us a metric over V.13 If you
give me a norm over V, I can use it to dene a metric over V. On the other hand, if I give
you a metric over V, you may or may not be able to use it to dene a norm over V. In
summary,
 every norm over V generates a metric;
 there are metrics over V that do not generate a norm over V; and thus,
13Note that (x   y) 2 V if x;y 2 V, by denition. This is why it makes sense to dene the metric using
the norm.
36 every normed vector space qualies as a metric space, but some metric spaces do
not qualify as a normed vector space.
[] A Banach Space is a complete normed vector space. The norm induces a metric, which
is turn allows us to talk about the convergence of cauchy sequences, and hence the com-
pleteness of a normed vector space.
37Topological Space
Suppose X = fa;b;c;dg is some set and consider the following sets.
 T1 = f;;fag;fb;c;dg;fa;b;c;dgg.
 T2 = ffag;fa;b;c;dgg.
 T3 = f;;fag;fbg;fa;b;c;dgg.
 T4 = f;;fa;bg;fb;c;dg;fa;b;c;dgg.
 T5 = f;;fa;b;c;dgg.
The irreducible elements of these four sets are subsets of the initial set we started with.
Now consider the following three properties.
 The empty set and the set X must be irreducible elements of the set Ti.
 The union of any number of irreducible elements of the set Ti must also be an
irreducible element of Ti.
 The intersection of any nite number of irreducible elements of the set Ti must also
be an irreducible element of Ti.
It can be easily veried that the set T1 and T5 satisfy each of these three properties,
but the sets T2;T3; and T4 do not satisfy at least one of the three properties. The sets
T1 and T5 are referred to as topologies on X. The structured sets (X;T1) and (X;T5) are
termed topological spaces. We may thus say that in order to formulate a topological space
we start with some set and the tool we use to add structure to it is a collection of subsets
of the starting set.
The elements of T1 (T5) are referred to as open sets in the associated topological space.
Thus, the subset fb;c;dg is an open set in the topological space (X;T1) but it is not an
open set in the topological space (X;T5). A quick summary of the main concepts follows.
[] Consider any non-empty set X. Let T be a collection of subsets of X. The structured
set (X;T) is called a topological space if
 ;;X 2 T;
 Arbitrary unions and nite intersections of elements of T are also in T.
[] If (X;T) is a topological space, then
 T is called a topology on X; and,
 Subsets of X that are elements of T are referred to as open sets in (X;T).
 Subsets of X whose complements are elements of T are referred to as closed sets.
38[] (X;T) is a Hausdor topological space if
 for each distinct pair of elements x;y 2 X
 9 tx;ty 2 T such that
 x 2 tx, y 2 ty, and tx \ ty = ;.
[] B  T is a basis for T if every element of T can be expressed as a union of members of B.
[] The smallest closed subset of (X;T) that contains the open subset A is referred to as
the closure of A.
[] Any subset A of X is a dense subset of (X;T) if the closure of A equals X.
[] N  X is a neighborhood of x 2 N if there exists an open set A such that p 2 U  N.
[] (X;T) is said to be connected if the only clopen subsets are ; and X.
[] f : (X;TX) ! (Y;TY ) is continuous if the pre-image of open subsets of (Y;TY ) is open
in (X;TX).
[] (X;TX) and (Y;TY ) are said to be homeomorphic if there exists an f : (X;TX) ! (Y;TY )
such that (i) f is one-to-one and onto, and (ii) both f and f 1 are continuous.
[] A  X is said to be a compact if every open cover of A has a nite subcover.
39Measure and Probability Space
[] Consider any non-empty set X and its power set P(X). A  P(X) is a -algebra over
X if
 X 2 A;
 A 2 A ) Ac 2 A; and,
 Countable union of elements in A is also an element of A.
[] The structured set (X;A) is a measurable space if A is a sigma algebra. The elements
of A are called measurable sets.
[] f : (X;AX) ! (Y;AY ) is a measurable function if the pre-image of a measurable set in
(Y;AY ) is a measurable set in (X;A).
[] The structured set (X;A;) is a measure space if A is a sigma algebra and the function
 : A ! R+ [ 1 is such that
 (;) = 0; and,
 ([Ai) =
P
(Ai), for any countable number of pairwise disjoint elements of A.
[] The structured set (X;A;P) is a probability space if
 A is a sigma algebra and P is a (probability) measure with P(X) = 1.
 X is the state space and elements of A are events.
[] Given a topological space (X;T), the collection Bt is a Borel-algebra if
 the set Bt is the unique smallest -algebra such that Bt  T.
[] f : (X;TX) ! (Y;TY ) is said to be Borel-measurable function if it is measurable once
X and Y are equipped with their respective Borel-algebras.
[] Given X  (Rn;de) and a Borel-algebra Be over X, the (unique) Lebesgue measure
l : Be ! R+ [ 1 is such that for any B 2 Be,
 l(B) = supf(C) : C  B is compactg = inff(O) : O  B is openg.
[] ((Rn;de);Be;l) is called a Lebesgue-measurable space.
40Individual Choice Theory: The Basics
The Basic Set Up
[1] X is a non-empty nite (or, countably innite) set of alternatives.
[2] R is a binary relation over the elements of X that can be used to provide some additional
structure to the elements of set X.
[3] For any pair of alternatives x;y 2 X, [xRy] means [x is at least as good as y].
[4] Some useful properties of R are formally listed in the following Table.
Table 9: Properties of Binary Relations
R is a If
Re
exive binary relation xRx; 8x 2 X
Transitive binary relation xRy and yRz imply xRz, 8x;y;z 2 X
Antisymmetric binary relation xRy and yRx imply x = y, 8x;y 2 X
Complete binary relation xRy or yRx, 8x;y 2 X
Symmetric binary relation xRy implies yRx, 8x;y 2 X
Asymmetric binary relation xRy implies + (yRx), 8x;y 2 X
[5] A binary relation R can often be decomposed into a symmetric part and an asymmetric
part. For example, suppose the binary relation R stands for `at least as good as.' Then,
we can dene (i) the symmetric binary relation IR derived from R to mean `as good as',
and (ii) the asymmetric binary relation PR derived from R to mean `strictly better than.'
Note that:
 xRy implies [xIRy or xPRy]
 xIRy implies [xRy and yRx] (i.e., IR is symmetric)
 xPRy implies [xRy and + (yRx)] (i.e., PR is asymmetric)
[6] We obtain dierent types of structured sets depending upon the properties of R. Some
useful types of structured sets are listed in the following Table.
Table 10: Structured sets using binary relations as the structuring tool








exive, Transitive, Antisymmetric, Complete
41[7] We will refer to R as the preference relation of the decision maker.
[8] Rational Preference Relation: If the decision maker can use his R to structure the
elements of X into a weakly-ordered set or a linearly ordered set, then we say that the
individual has rational preferences over the elements of the set X.
[9] It is important to note that the word rational is a essentially a convenient (and, some-
what reasonable) label.
[10] Let u : X ! R be some function that takes an element from the set X as the input
and provides a real number as the output.
[11] We say that a function u : X ! R represents the preference relation R if
 for any pair of alternatives x;y 2 X,
 xRy i u(x)  u(y).
[12] If we can nd at least one function such that
 xRy i u(x)  u(y) for any pair of alternatives x;y 2 X,
 then we refer to the function u as a utility function,
 and say that the preference relation R admits a utility function representation.
[13] The concept of a utility function is simply a re-formatting of the information contained
in the preference relation into a more readily usable form. In fact, one can do (almost)
everything in economics without ever introducing the notion of a utility function. We
often deal directly with utility functions instead of preference relations because it usually
makes the math relatively easy.
[14] Some of the most basic questions of individual choice theory are:
 Can every preference relation be represented by a function?
 What properties must be satised by the preference relation so that it can denitely
be represented by a function?
 If the preference relation can be represented by a function, then is this function
unique?
 If a preference relation can be represented by many functions, and we know one of
these functions, then can we nd all the remaining such functions using only the one
we know?
42Utility Representation Theorem: When jXj is Uncountable
The Basic Set Up
[1] X  RL is an uncountable set of alternatives in the L-dimensional Euclidean Space.
[2] R is a binary preference relation over the elements of X.
[3] For any pair of alternatives x;y 2 X, [xRy] means [x is at least as good as y].
[4] Let u : X ! R be some function that takes an element from the set X as the input and
provides a real number as the output.
The Axioms
[W] R is a rational binary preference relation
 R is a weak-order.
[C] R is a continuous binary preference relation
 for any x 2 X,
 the sets B(x) = fy 2 X : yRxg and W(x) = fy 2 X : xRyg
 are closed subsets of X.
UR-Theorem 2: Any continuous weak-order dened over a non-empty uncountable set
X  RL admits representation by a continuous utility function; and, the utility function is
unique up to strictly increasing transformations.
43Individual Choice Under Risk
The Basic Set Up
[1] Let N denote the set f1;2;:::;ng with cardinality N.
[2] X is a non-empty nite set of outcomes with jXj = N. Let X = fx1;x2;:::;xk;:::;xng.
[3] Let L denote the set of all lotteries that can be constructed by using the set X.
[4] Any lottery l 2 L species the probabilities fpk(l)gk2N with which the agent will obtain
the outcome fxkgk2N. For any lottery l 2 L
 pk(l) 2 [0;1] 8k 2 N and
P
k2N pk(l) = 1.
[5] What is the cardinality of the set L? What does it look like?
[6] We are interested in understanding how an agent will make a choice when faced with
a subset of alternatives from the set L.
[7] R is a binary preference relation over the elements of L. We shall denote the symmetric
and asymmetric parts of R by I and P, respectively. Note that R is dened over an
uncountable set.
[8] For any pair of lotteries l;~ l 2 L, [l R ~ l] means [lottery l is at least as good as lottery ~ l].





[10] Let u : X ! R be a utility function that represents preferences over the elements of





[11] The set f^ l = (l+(1 )~ l) :  2 [0;1]g contains all the compound lotteries (convex
combinations) that can be constructed using any pair of lotteries l;~ l 2 L.
The Axioms
[W] R is a rational binary preference relation
 R is a complete pre-order. (What does this mean for the preferences over X?)
[C] R is a continuous binary preference relation
 For any three lotteries l;~ l;^ l 2 L,
 if l P ~ l P ^ l,
 then there exist ; 2 (0;1) such that,
 (  l + (1   )  ^ l) P ~ l P (  l + (1   )  ^ l).
[IIA] R is an IIA binary preference relation
44 For any l;~ l;^ l 2 L and any  2 (0;1),
 [l R ~ l] i [(  l + (1   )  ^ l) R (  ~ l + (1   )  ^ l)].
Interpretation of IIA
The IIA axiom formalizes the notion of dynamic consistency. It assumes that the agent
would make the same choice in each of the following four cases.
[Case 1] The agent has to choose between the lotteries l and ~ l.
[Case 2] The experimenter rst chooses whether or not the agent will get a chance to
make a choice. With probability (1   ) the agent will not get a chance to choose, and
will be awarded the lottery ^ l; with the remaining probability  the agent gets to choose,
and is asked to report his choice between the lotteries l and ~ l.
[Case 3] Same as (ii) except that the agent is asked to report her choice between l and ~ l
before knowing whether he will actually get the chance to choose between the lotteries l
and ~ l.
[Case 4] The agent is asked to choose between (  l + (1   ) ^ l) and ( ~ l + (1   ) ^ l).
Experimental Procedure to test IIA
 The participants in the experiment will be presented each of these four scenarios and
their choices will be observed.
 The fraction of participants who do not report the same answer for each of the four
questions can be easily calculated.
 This procedure will be repeated for several combinations of the three lotteries de-
noted by l;~ l; and ^ l.
 If a signicant fraction of participants report dierent answers to the four questions
in all the repetitions of the experiment, then we can conclude that the Independence
axiom does not provide an accurate description of individual decision making in the
presence of risk.
VNM Theorem: The binary preference relation R satises W, C, and IIA
 i there exists a function u : X ! R such that,
{ for every pair of lotteries l;~ l 2 L,
{ [l R ~ l] i [U(ljX)  U(~ ljX)].
 The utility function u() is unique up to positive linear transformations.
45Subjective Probabilities I: De Finnetti's Theorem
The Basic Set Up
[1] Let S = fs1;s2;:::;sng denote the set of states with cardinality n.
[2] Let X be the vector space over Rn. Any x 2 X will be denoted as (x1;:::;xn).
[3] The function f : S ! X is a bet which species the amount of monetary gain or loss to
the decision maker for each possible state that may be realized. Thus, the bet f essentially
means the vector (f(s1);:::;f(sn)). Let F denote the set of all possible bets.
[4] We are interested in the decision makers ranking over the elements of F.
[5] R is a binary preference relation over the elements of the uncountable set F. We shall
denote the symmetric and asymmetric parts of R by I and P, respectively.
[6] For any pair of bets f;g 2 F, [fRg] means [bet f is at least as good as bet g].
[7] Note that the [fRg] amounts to saying that [the vector (f(s1);:::;f(sn)) is at least as
good as the vector (g(s1);:::;g(sn))].
The Axioms
[W] R is a rational binary preference relation
 R is a weak order dened over F. (Or, R is a weak order dened over X.)
[C] R is a continuous binary preference relation
 For any x 2 X,
 the sets U(x) = fy 2 X : yRxg and L(x) = fy 2 X : xRyg
 are closed subsets of X.
[A] R is an additive binary preference relation
 For any x;y;z 2 X,
 xRy i (x + z)R(y + z).14
[M] R is a monotonic binary preference relation
 For any x;y 2 X,
 if xiRyi 8i 2 S,
 then xRy.
14This axiom makes sense only if the decision maker is risk-neutral. For example, let n = 2, and assume
(; )I( ;). For x = z = (; ) and y = ( ;), additivity would imply (2; 2)I(0;0), which
would be sensible only under risk-neutrality.
46[N] There exist x;y 2 X such that xPy.
Theorem: R satises the axioms W, C, A, M, and N i there exists a unique probability
vector p 2 n 1 such that [xRy] i [p  x  p  y].15
Elicitation of subjective probabilities
Suppose a decision-maker behaves in accordance with this theorem. We can elicit his
subjective probability over any state i 2 S by asking him to report the scalar  2 [0;1]
such that
(0;0;:::;1;:::;0)I(;;:::;):
Because, this indierence will imply that pi = .
15
n 1 is the (n-1)-dimensional unit simplex.
47Subjective Probabilities II: Savage's Theorem
The Basic Set Up
[] Let S denote the unstructured set of states.
[] Any non-empty subset A  S is referred to as an event.
[] Let X be the unstructured set of outcomes.
[] The function f : S ! X is an act which species the outcome for the decision maker for
each state in S. Let F denote the set of all possible acts.
[] A constant act fx 2 Fc  F leads to the same outcome x 2 X in all states.
[] We are interested in the decision maker's ranking over acts, i.e., the elements of F.
[] R is a binary preference relation over the elements of F. We shall denote the symmetric
and asymmetric parts of R by I and P, respectively.
[] For any pair of acts f;g 2 F, [fRg] means [act f is at least as good as act g].
[] fRAg means that given the event A  S, act f is at least as good as act g.
[] fRAg(s) means that given A  S, act f is at least as good as the constant act g(s).
The Axioms
[W] R is a transitive and complete binary relation dened over F.
[I1] The ranking of a pair of acts should be independent of the events where they lead to
identical outcomes. This is formalized by requiring that what outcomes they lead to in
states where they lead to identical outcomes, should not matter.
 For every f;g;h;h0 2 F, and any A  S,
 [(f;A;h;Ac)R(g;A;h;Ac)] i [(f;A;h0;Ac)R(g;A;h0;Ac)].
[I2] The ranking of a pair of acts that dier only on a non-null event and are constant
over that event, should be consistent with the ranking of the corresponding constant acts.
Implicitly, this amounts to state-independent ranking of outcomes.
 For every f 2 F, any fx;fy 2 Fc, and any non-null event A  S,
 [(fx;A;f;Ac)R(fy;A;f;Ac)] i [fxRfy].
[I3] The inferred (qualitative) relative likelihood of any two events should be independent
of the pair of constant acts employed in the inference.
 For every A;B  S, and any fx;fy;fz;fw 2 Fc
 if fxPfy and fzPfw,
 then [(fx;A;fy;Ac)R(fx;B;fy;Bc)] i [(fz;A;fw;Ac)R(fz;B;fw;Bc)].
48[N] There exist f;g 2 F such that fPg.
[CS] Given fPg, we can always nd acts f0 and g0 which are minor perturbations of f and
g such that f0Rg and fRg0. It rules out S to be nite.
 For every f;g;h 2 F,
 if fPg,





 For every f;g 2 F, any event A  S,
 if fRAg(s) for all s 2 A, then fRAg; and,
 if g(s)RAf for all s 2 A, then gRAf.
Theorem 1: For any X, R satises all the seven axioms i there exists a non-atomic
nitely additive probability measure  over S and a non-constant bounded function u :








Theorem 2: For a nite X, R satises the axioms W, I1, I2, I3, N, CS i there exists
a non-atomic nitely additive probability measure  over S and a non-constant bounded








Note 1: The measure  is unique and the utility function u is unique up to positive linear
transformations in both theorems.
Note 2: The theorems essentially lead to (i) state-independent ranking of outcomes and
(ii) outcome independent likelihood of events on part of the decision-maker.
Note 3: Axiom I1 is often referred to as the sure-thing principle. Axiom I2 is referred to
as monotonicity. Axiom I3 is the counterpart of I2 wrt likelihood of events rather than
ranking of outcomes. CS and CX capture some notion of continuity.
49Arrow's Impossibility Theorem for f : LN ! L
The Basic Set Up
[1] V is a nite set of voters with jVj = N  2.
[2] A is a nite set of candidates with jAj = M  3.
[3] L is the set of all linear orders (strict rankings) on A with jLj = (M!).
[4] L denotes an element of the set L. Li will denote the ranking provided by voter i 2 V.
[5] For any a;b 2 A, [aLib] means [a is above b in the individual ranking provided by i 2 V].
[6] LN 2 LN denotes a possible collection of N rankings. Note: LN  (L1;L2;:::;Ln).
[7] LN denotes the set of all possible collective rankings with jLNj = (M!)N.
[8] f : LN ! L denotes a Social Choice Rule (SCR) that uses the individual rankings
provided by the N voters as input and generates a social ranking of the candidates as the
output. It must produce an output for each of the (M!)N possible inputs.
[9] [af(LN)b] means [a is above b in the social ranking corresponding to the input LN].
[10] f : LN ! L is a Dictatorial (D) SCR if 9!i 2 V such that
 for every input LN 2 LN and every pair of alternatives a;b 2 A,
 [af(LN)b] i [aLib].
[11] The number of possible SCRs is (M!)((M!)N) (out of which N are dictatorial). The
aim is to gure out which of these SCRs satisfy a list of desirable properties formulated
as axioms.
[Axiom P] Pareto SCR
 For any input LN 2 LN and any pair of alternatives a;b 2 A,
 if aLib 8i 2 V,
 then af(LN)b.
[Axiom IIA] Independent of Irrelevant Alternatives SCR
 For any pair of inputs LN; ~ LN 2 LN, and any pair of alternatives a;b 2 A.
 if [aLib i a~ Lib & bLia i b~ Lia] 8i 2 V,
 then [af(LN)b i af(~ LN)b & bf(LN)a i bf(~ LN)a].
Theorem: If the SCR f : LN ! L satises P and IIA, then it is Dictatorial.
50Arrow's Theorem for f : LN ! A
The Basic Set Up
[1] V = f1;2;:::;ng is a nite set of voters with jVj = N  2.
[2] A is a nite set of candidates with jAj = M  3.
[3] L is the set of all linear orders (strict rankings) on A.
[4] L denotes an element of the set L. Li will denote the ranking provided by voter i 2 V.
[5] For any a;b 2 A, [aLib] means [a is above b in the individual ranking provided by i 2 V].
[6] LN 2 LN denotes a possible collection of N rankings. Note: LN  (L1;L2;:::;Ln).
[7] ~ LN is a monotonic transformation of LN 2 LN around a 2 A if
 8i 2 V, and for every b 2 A   a,
 if aLib,
 then a~ Lib.
[8] f : LN ! L denotes a Social Choice Rule (SCR) that uses the individual rankings
provided by the N voters as input and generates the name of the winning candidate as
the output.
[9] f : LN ! A is a Dictatorial (D) SCF if 9!i 2 V such that
 for every input LN 2 LN,
 f(LN)  f(Li;LN 1
 i ) = a i a is at the top of Li,
 for any a 2 A.
The Axioms
[P] Pareto SCF
 For any input LN 2 LN and any alternative a 2 A.
 if LN is such that a is at the top of Li 8i 2 V,
 then f(LN) = a.
[MM] Maskin Monotonic SCF
 For any pair of inputs LN; ~ LN 2 LN and any alternative a 2 A,
 if ~ LN is a monotonic transformation of LN around a,
 then [if f(LN) = a, then f(~ LN) = a].
Theorem 2: For M  3, if the SCF f : LN ! A satises P and MM, then it is D.
51Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
The Basic Set Up
[1] V = f1;2;:::;ng is a nite set of voters with jVj = N  2.
[2] A is a nite set of candidates with jAj = M  3.
[3] L is the set of all linear orders (strict rankings) on A.
[4] L denotes an element of the set L. Li will denote the ranking provided by voter i 2 V.
[5] For any a;b 2 A, [aLib] means [a is above b in the individual ranking provided by i 2 V].
[6] LN 2 LN denotes a possible collection of N rankings. Note: LN  (L1;L2;:::;Ln).
[7] ~ LN is a monotonic transformation of LN 2 LN around a 2 A if
 8i 2 V, and for every b 2 A   a,
 if aLib,
 then a~ Lib.
[8] f : LN ! L denotes a Social Choice Rule (SCR) that uses the individual rankings
provided by the N voters as input and generates the name of the winning candidate as
the output.
[9] [f(LN)Lif(~ LN)] means [the winning candidate corresponding to input LN is above the
winning candidate corresponding to input ~ LN according to Li].
[10] f : LN ! A is a Dictatorial (D) SCF if 9!i 2 V such that
 for every input LN 2 LN,
 f(LN)  f(Li;LN 1
 i ) = a i a is at the top of Li,
 for any a 2 A.
The Axioms
[P] Pareto SCF
 For any input LN 2 LN and any alternative a 2 A.
 if LN is such that a is at the top of Li 8i 2 V,
 then f(LN) = a.
[MM] Maskin Monotonic SCF
 For any pair of inputs LN; ~ LN 2 LN and any alternative a 2 A,
 if ~ LN is a monotonic transformation of LN around a,
 then [if f(LN) = a, then f(~ LN) = a].
52[CS] Citizen Sovereign SCF
 For every alternative a 2 A,
 9LN 2 LN such that,
 f(LN) = a.
[SP] Strategy Proof SCF
 For any input LN 2 LN and any (other) individual ranking ~ Li 2 L   Li,
 if the winner at input (~ Li;LN 1
 i ) is not the winner at input LN,
 then the winner at input (~ Li;LN 1
 i ) must be below the winner at input LN according
to Li,
 for every voter in the set of voters.
Result 3: For M  3:
[3.1a] If the SCF f is SP, then it will be MM; and
[3.1b] If the SCF f is MM and CS, then it will be PE.
Thus, [3.1a] and [3.1b] imply:
[3.2] If the SCF f is SP and CS, then it will be MM and PE.
We know from Theorem 2 that:
[3.3] If the SCF f is MM and PE, then it will be D.
Hence,
Theorem 3: For M  3, if the SCF f : LN ! A satises SP and CS, then it is D.
53Axiomatization of Pairwise Simple-Majority Rule
The Basic Set Up
[2] V = f1;2;:::;ng is a nite set of voters with cardinality N  2.
[2] A = f+1; 1g is a nite set of candidates with jAj = M = 2.
[3] di 2 D = f+1;0; 1g denotes a possible input provided by voter i 2 V.
[4] dN 2 DN denotes a possible collection of N individual inputs (one by each i 2 V).
[5] dN 2 DN is a N-dimensional vector (d1;:::;di;:::;dn) since each di is a scalar.
[6] DN is the set of all possible inputs and jDNj = 3N.
[7] For any input dN 2 DN, the input where every voter reverses his vote is denoted by
 1  dN.
[8] ~ dN is called a permutation of dN 2 DN if both dN and ~ dN have same entries but by
dierent voters. Thus, ~ dN is a permutation of dN if both have the same number of 0's,
1's, and -1's.
[9] f : DN ! D denotes a Social Choice Function (SCF).
[10] Sign[s()] : DN ! D takes a dN 2 DN as the input and provides the sign of the sum
of entries in dN as the output.
[11] A SCF is the PSMR if f(dN) = Sign[s(dN)]; 8dN 2 DN.
The Axioms
[PR] Positively Responsive SCF
 For any pair of inputs dN; ~ dN 2 DN,
 if 9k 2 V such that [(~ dk > dk) & (~ di = di 8i 2 V   fkg)],
 then [f(dN)  0] ) [f(~ dN) = +1].
[N] Neutral SCF
 For any pair of inputs dN; ~ dN 2 DN,
 if [~ dN =  1  dN],
 then [f(dN) =  f(~ dN)].
[A] Anonymous SCF
 For any pair of inputs dN; ~ dN 2 DN,
 if [~ dN is a permutation of dN]
 then [f(~ dN) = f(dN)].
Theorem 4: For M = 2, a SCF f : DN ! D satises PR, N, and A i it is the PSMR.
54One Sided One-to-One Matching Problem
[1] A is a nite set of agents with cardinality jAj = N.
[2] H is a nite set of objects with cardinality jHj = N.
[3] L denotes the nite set of all possible strict rankings over the objects in H.
[4] LN denotes the nite set of all possible elements in the N-fold cartesian product of L.
[5] XN  (X1;X2;:::;Xn) 2 XN denotes a possible allocation-vector of the objects to
agents such that the element Xi 2 H denotes the object allocated to agent i 2 A. More-
over, jXij = 1 for all i 2 A which implies [i2A Xi = H, and for any distinct i;j 2 A,
Xi \ Xj = f;g.
[6] An allocation mechanism is a one-to-one and onto function f : LN ! XN which takes
the reported rankings of all the N agents as the input and produces an allocation-vector
as the output.
[7] The allocation vector f(LN) will often be written as (f1(LN);f2(LN);:::;fn(LN)).
[8] The notation [f(LN) = XN] means that [when the mechanism receives the collec-
tion of preference rankings LN 2 LN as the input, then it produces the allocation vector
XN 2 XN as the output]. Moreover, fi(LN) = Xi, 8i 2 A.
[9] The notation [fi(LN)Lifi(~ LN)] means that [agent i 2 A ranks the object he receives
when the input is LN higher than the object he receives when the input is ~ LN according
to preference ranking Li].
The Axioms
[PE] Pareto Ecient Mechanism
 For any input LN 2 LN, there does not exist any allocation vector ~ XN 2 XN f(LN),
such that,
 ~ XiLifi(LN) for at least one i 2 A,
 and fi(LN)Li ~ Xi for no i 2 A.
[SP] Strategy Proof Mechanism
 For any input (Li;LN 1
 i ) 2 LN and any other input (~ Li;LN 1
 i ) 2 LN,
 if f(~ Li;LN 1
 i ) 6= f(LN),
 then fi(LN)Lif(~ Li;LN 1
 i ),
 8i 2 A.
Theorem: A mechanism for the standard one-sided matching problem is ecient and
strategy proof if and only if it is the Serial Dictatorship mechanism.
55One Sided One-to-Many Matching Problem
[1] A is a nite set of agents with cardinality jAj = N.
[2] H is a nite set of objects with cardinality jHj = M.
[3] P(H) denotes the power set (the collection of all subsets) of the set H.
[4] L is the nite set of all possible strict rankings over the elements in P(H).
[5] XN  (X1;X2;:::;Xn) 2 XN denotes a possible allocation-vector of the objects to
agents such that the element Xi 2 P(H) denotes the subset of objects in H allocated to
agent i 2 A. Moreover, Xi 2 P(H), and 0  jXij  M for all i 2 A, [i2A Xi  H, and for
any distinct i;j 2 A, Xi \ Xj = f;g.
[6] An allocation mechanism is a one-to-one function f : LN ! XN which takes the re-
ported rankings of all the N agents as the input and produces an allocation-vector as the
output.
[7] The allocation vector f(LN) will often be written as (f1(LN);f2(LN);:::;fn(LN)).
[8] The notation [f(LN) = XN] means that [when the mechanism receives the collec-
tion of preference rankings LN 2 LN as the input, then it produces the allocation vector
XN 2 XN as the output]. Moreover, fi(LN) = Xi, 8i 2 A.
[9] The notation [fi(LN)Lifi(~ LN)] means that [agent i 2 A ranks the set of objects he
receives when the input is LN higher than the set of objects he receives when the input is
~ LN according to preference ranking Li].
The Axioms
[PE] Pareto Ecient Mechanism
 For any input LN 2 LN, there does not exist any allocation vector ~ XN 2 XN f(LN),
such that,
 ~ XiLifi(LN) for at least one i 2 A, and fi(LN)Li ~ Xi for no i 2 A.
[SP] Strategy Proof Mechanism
 For any input (Li;LN 1
 i ) 2 LN and any other input (~ Li;LN 1
 i ) 2 LN,
 if f(~ Li;LN 1
 i ) 6= f(LN), then fi(LN)Lif(~ Li;LN 1
 i ), 8i 2 A.
[NB] Non-bossy Mechanism
 For any input (Li;LN 1
 i ) 2 LN and any other input (~ Li;LN 1
 i ) 2 LN,
 if fi(LN) = fi(~ Li;LN 1
 i ), then f(LN) = f(~ Li;LN 1
 i ), 8i 2 A.
Theorem: An allocation mechanism for the one-sided matching problem with multiple
assignments is ecient, strategy proof, and non-bossy if and only if it is the Sequential
Dictatorship mechanism.
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